In the last decades the recruitment of the mechanism of Embodied Simulation during the processing of metaphors has been extensively investigated. Behavioural, neuroimaging and neurostimulation studies, have shown that when we process bodily-related metaphors we somatotopically recruit the sensorimotor system. However, in the current debate, the role of the mechanism of simulation is considered quite controversial for at least two reasons. The first is empirically based. Data on the recruitment of Embodied Simulation during the comprehension of metaphors have not been consistently replicated. The second is theoretical. The activation of the mechanism of simulation is considered a by-product of the processing of language.

In this talk I will present behavioural and neuroimaging data that support an embodied perspective on metaphor processing. These findings also indicate that the extent to which bodily knowledge is recruited varies considerably depending on factors such as the degree of conventionality or novelty of an expression, as well as whether the figurative expression is processed in a first or a second language. Taken together, these findings support an embodied account of metaphor comprehension. Most importantly, at the same time, they suggest two important considerations. The first is that a more-fine grained notion of metaphors and their processing modalities is fundamental to understand the role of the body in the construction and neural representation of figurative meaning. Patterns of neural activation reflect the ways in which metaphors are processed. Distinct modes of metaphor processing are associated with different neural representations, including varying degrees of engagement of the sensorimotor system. Second, embodiment is not a binary concept. We cannot just say that meaning is or is not embodied. Embodiment is a gradient.